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Blockchain and the Inevitability of
Disputes:
The Role for Online Dispute
Resolution
Orna Rabinovich-Einy* and Ethan Katsh**
I loved the Internet. But 25 years later, I see the words “the block-
chain is the new Internet” scrolling down Twitter and I want to shake
my news feed by the scruff of the neck and growl: Have you people
learned nothing?!1
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain seems to be everywhere these days. It is touted as the new fool-
proof technology, which can be used for everything from cryptocurrencies, through
land registries to identity cards and health records.2 Enthusiasts have predicted that
it will bring about deep change, ensuring data security and identity authentication,
while doing away with traditional intermediaries.3
With blockchain we are told that it is the “new internet,”4 an application that
will change the way we transact—strengthening commitments and ensuring seam-
less execution.5 At the same time, and at an alarming frequency, we hear about
mass scale fraudulent schemes attacking cryptocurrency exchanges, resulting in the
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1. Andrew Leonard, The Blockchain Is a Reminder of the Internet’s Failure, ONE ZERO (Dec. 5,
2018), https://medium.com/s/love-hate/the-blockchain-is-a-reminder-of-the-internets-failure-
b16c58d70413.
2. Daniel J. Neally &Maria L. Hodge, Blockchain in the Courts, 5 CTR. FOR L., SCI. & INNOVATION
1 (2018).
3. Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex
Cryptographia 1, 48-49 (2015), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=258
0664.
4. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, LEGAL Education in the Blockchain Rev-
olution, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 351 (2017); Rich Daly, Blockchain: Wall Street’s Most Game-
Changing Technology Advance Since the Internet, FORBES (July 11, 2016), available at: https://w
ww.forbes.com/sites/richdaly/2016/07/11/blockchain-wall-streets-most-game-changing-technology-ad-
vance-since-the-internet/#4810e88f4d87.
5. Jean Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified, 10 (2017), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3091218 (Feb. 28, 2019).
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loss of many millions of dollars.6 Aside from fraud, other problems abound, result-
ing from misunderstandings between transacting parties, loss of passwords and pri-
vacy risks, to name a few.7
The gap between the promise of an infallible, dispute-less environment and the
inevitable reality of having to deal with disputes in the blockchain setting lies at the
heart of this paper. It is, we contend, impossible to enjoy high levels of human
interaction without generating conflict.8 The inevitability of disputes is enhanced
in a potentially lucrative environment of innovation and complexity, such as the
blockchain.9 In such settings, unexpected developments are bound to occur, and
expectations of interacting parties are likely to differ. Indeed, this was our experi-
ence with the internet of the 1990s as the e-commerce setting began to flourish.
Initially, disputes were not the focus of attention and avenues of redress were diffi-
cult to come by.10 Over time it became clear, that for e-commerce to evolve there
needed to be trust by users, and for trust to be sustained, e-commerce platforms
needed to institutionalize avenues for addressing and preventing disputes.11 These
processes have come to be known as “online dispute resolution” (or ODR).12 The
lessons learned from the evolution of ODR are slowly penetrating the blockchain
arena, as some entities are developing ODR tools and processes that are tailored to
this environment.13 At the same time, for ODR to be adopted and used, some of the
underlying assumptions driving the design and adoption of blockchain technology
need to be relaxed, as they are in tension with the tenets of dispute systems design:
recognizing the inevitability of conflict, understanding trust as a human construct,
and assigning weight to individual needs alongside group ideology.14
This article establishes its main theses in the following order. Part II provides
background on the history and evolution of the blockchain, highlighting its domi-
nant applications and its principal features. We discuss governance and trust on
blockchain, finding that despite a rhetoric of disintermediation and distribution of
power, there are still some players that enjoy more power than others in the block-
chain setting. Furthermore, we highlight the governance choices that can shape the
extent to which power is concentrated, accountability is established, and avenues of
redress are available. In Part III we briefly discuss the history of ODR and describe
the leading ODR schemes that have emerged for the blockchain setting, illuminat-
ing similarities and distinctions among them. Despite growing interest in ODR for
6. Michael Matthews, List of Bitcoin Hacks (2012-2016), STEEMIT, availabl at:
https://steemit.com/bitcoin/@michaelmatthews/list-of-bitcoin-hacks-2012-2016 (last visited Apr. 14,
2019); Anna Irrera, More Than 10 Percent of $3.7 Billion Raised in ICOs Has Been Stolen: Ernst &
Young, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2018), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/ico-ernstyoung/more-th
an-10-percent-of-3-7-bln-raised-in-icos-has-been-stolen-ernst-young-id; Nathaniel Popper, As Bitcoin
Bubble Loses Air, Frauds and Flaws Rise to Surface, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018), available at: https://ww
w.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/technology/virtual-currency-regulation.html.
7. Bacon et al., supra note 5, at 16-49.
8. ETHAN KATSH&ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNET
OFDISPUTES (2017).
9. Kevin Werbach, Trust, But Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
489, 496-97 (2018).
10. Wright & De Filippi, supra note 5, at 47.
11. Id. at 48-50.
12. ETHAN KATSH& JANET RIFKIN, ONLINEDISPUTE RESOLUTION: RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN CYBE
RSPACE (2001).
13. See infra Part III.
14. Id.
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blockchain, the use of these initiatives has yet to spread. We explore the various
barriers that stand in the way of ODR for blockchain gaining momentum in Part IV.
II. BLOCKCHAIN: SOME BACKGROUND
A. History and Evolution
In the brief history of blockchain, its evolution, much like the technology itself,
can be described as including several building blocks. The first stage in the devel-
opment of blockchain had to do with the development of bitcoin a decade ago. De-
spite its recent emergence, bitcoin is based on prior works, developed as early as
the 1990s. One such work is the Paxos Protocol, which drew on the legislative
model employed in ancient Greece as an inspiration for a distributed database.15
The idea was to do away with traditional third-party intermediaries, and create al-
ternative structures for ensuring the credibility of information.16
The concept of a chain of data blocks was developed over time, but it took
several years before a mature vision materialized. Beyond the need for technology
to advance and mature, the impetus for the development of bitcoin was, to a large
extent, the 2008 recession and rising distrust of financial institutions and other in-
termediaries.17 Thereafter, in 2009, Satoshi Nakamoto, an individual whose iden-
tity has still not been established, described bitcoin in his white paper.18 The white
paper delineated a decentralized currency in a global environment that builds trust
without reliance on traditional trust-building institutions.19
The principal design challenge for bitcoin was how to create a distributed, de-
centralized database in which anyone could access the data, add to the data, and
broadcast the data, while ensuring the accuracy of the database and the authenticity
of users’ identity.20 These challenges were met by creating a ledger of past financial
transactions that is public and open, but is protected from unauthorized access, mis-
takes, and abuse, through cryptography and a complex architecture of incentives
and required tasks.
Users who wish to add transactions to the ledger use private key encryption to
authenticate their identity and to allow for the authorization of transactions.21 Min-
ers verify the transaction by solving a hash puzzle (an algorithmic cryptographic
function).22 Hash puzzles are used as “proof of work” (POW).23 While miners
solve the hash puzzle, the blocks await confirmation for ten minutes. During this
time blocks containing information on all pending transactions are broadcast to all
miners. For each block, a miner solves the hash puzzle. This is meant to serve two
15. Leslie Lamport, The Part-Time Parliament, 16 ACM TRANSACTIONS ONCOMPUT. SYS. 133, 135-
37 (1998).
16. Id. at 155-57.
17. Kurt Fanning & David P. Centers, Blockchain and Its Coming Impact on Financial Services, 27 J.
CORP. ACCT. & FIN. 53, 54 (2016).
18. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2009), available at: https://bi
tcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
19. Id. at 1-2.
20. Id. at 8.
21. Werbach, supra note 11, at 503-04; J. H.Witte, The Blockchain: A Gentle Four Page Introduction,
CORNELLU. LIBR. 2 (Dec. 6, 2016), available at: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1612.06244.
22. Werbach, supra note 11, at 504-05.
23. Id.
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goals. First, miners are incentivized to work by being paid in bitcoin for solving
the puzzle.24 Since the puzzle is computationally expensive it also serves to deter
abuse by miners.25 In addition, because hash values uncover whether data was tam-
pered with, the puzzle promotes a second goal, that of ensuring the authenticity of
the data.26 After the puzzle is solved, other miners verify POW and, if approved,
the block is added to the chain and maintained by “nodes”—computers on which a
copy of the ledger is kept.27 Since there are multiple nodes receiving information
on transactions from different miners asynchronously, there need to be measures in
place to ensure that transactions are recorded consistently by all nodes. To that end,
blocks are time stamped and in case of conflicting transactions, the earlier transac-
tion prevails and the longest chain (that with the most POW built into it) wins.28 A
consensus protocol is in place to ensure that nodes become consistent by choosing
the longest chain.29 “Orphan blocks” (“Uncle” in Ethereum) that do not appear in
the correct chain are discarded by those nodes which chose the “wrong” chain. The
orphan blocks return to the pool of transactions waiting to be processed.30
Alongside miners and nodes, developers are also key players, because they cre-
ate the protocol and maintain the blockchain. They also advance additional imple-
mentations, and so they impact the entire community. They are incentivized by the
expansion of their work’s popularity, as well as the growth of the community and,
consequently, of their stake. But overall, there needs to be a better system of incen-
tives for long-term development of protocols.31
To date, bitcoin presents the most successful use case of blockchain technology
and represents the single most significant stage of its evolution, resulting in the
spread of cryptocurrencies.32 At the same time, bitcoin’s limitations became in-
creasingly apparent over the years, as mining power became concentrated in few
hands and as some community members demonstrated that bitcoin is not the immu-
table setting it was promised, when they instituted code changes referred to as “hard
forks” and broke off to create their own competing cryptocurrency environment.33
The limitations of bitcoin helped spur the second important milestone in the
evolution of blockchain—the expansion of blockchain use and applications beyond
24. Id. at 506; Nakamoto, supra note 20, at 4, 8. The founders of bitcoin created a cap on the amount
of bitcoin that can be issued as payment for miners in the amount of 21 million bitcoins. See Important
Bitcoin Basics and How it All Works: Things You Need to Know, BITCOIN.COM, available at: https://ww
w.bitcoin.com/you-need-to-know (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
25. Id. at 8.
26. Werbach, supra note 11, at 491-493.
27. Bacon et al., supra note 7, at 12; Nakamoto, supra note 20, at 3.
28. Id. at 16.
29. Id. at 13, 21-24; Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection,
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2014).
30. Jack Frankenfield, Orphan Block (Cryptocurrency), INVESTOPEDIA (APR. 11, 2018), available at:
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/orphan-block-cryptocurrency.asp.
31. Difference Between On-Chain and Off-Chain Governance, MEDIUM.COM (June 5, 2018), availa-
ble at: https://medium.com/@BLMPNetwork/difference-between-on-chain-and-off-chain-governance-
c881cd3e6374; Bacon et al., supra note 7, at 89.
32. Massimo Bartoletti & Livio Pompianu, An Empirical Analysis of Smart Contracts: Platforms,
Applications, and Design Patterns, CORNELLU. (Mar. 18, 2017), available at: https://arxiv.org/pdf/170
3.06322.pdf.
33. Bacon et al., supra note 7, at 21, 34.
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cryptocurrencies. This development is most commonly associated with the estab-
lishment of Ethereum in 2015.34 Ethereum emerged six years after bitcoin and its
founder, the then 19-year old Vitalik Buterin, sought to expand the use of block-
chain beyond cryptocurrencies (although Ethereum did introduce its own “Ether”
coin) 36F35 to the realm of “smart contracts” 37F36 or “distributed autonomous organiza-
tions” (DAOs)—entities that operate through smart contracts. 38F37 Ethereum estab-
lished a broad community of users and processed a high level of daily transactions. 39F38
Approximately 200 million known transactions were made between 2013-2017 (ex-
cluding transactions made in private blockchains), transferring value of roughly
$100,000 a day. 40F39 Ethereum seemed to incorporate some of the lessons of the
bitcoin experience by expanding beyond currencies and adopting a more centralized
structure than bitcoin through its core developer group.41F40 Millions of dollars were
raised through Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) on Ethereum, and in May 2016 The
DAO was introduced. The platform would allow anyone to pitch an idea and re-
ceive funding from the platform, thereby democratizing access to investments for
individuals. 42F41 Soon thereafter, in June of 2017, a hacker found a coding loophole
that allowed him to steal $70 million within hours. 43F42 In an attempt to address its
vulnerability, the system performed a rollback which sought to erase the attack and
its consequences, signaling above all that the immutability of transactions on block-
chain was no longer an absolute truism. 44F43 A “hard fork” followed resulting in a
new Ethereum Classic (ETC). 45F44 To make matters worse for The DAO, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission issued a ruling in 2017 that The DAO’s offering
was subject to the laws and regulations governing initial public offerings, and there-
fore The DAO and its investors may have violated federal securities laws. 46 F45 The
DAO has since been terminated, but it continues to impact current uses of block-
chain. 47 F46
Around the same time, we also started seeing a growing interest in use of block-
chain technology by public entities.47 Estonia and Sweden, for example, have been
34. Vitalik Buterin, A Next Generation Smart Contract & Decentralized Application Platform,
ETHEREUM WHITE PAPER (2015), available at: http://blockchainlab.com/pdf/Ethereum_white_paper-
a_next_generation_smart_contract_and_decentralized_application_platform-vitalik-buterin.pdf.
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id. at 1.
37. Id. at 23-24.
38. Bartoletti & Pompianu, supra note 34, at 6.
39. Id.
40. Buterin, supra note 36, at 13, 27-28.
41. Adam J. Sulkowski, Blockchain, Law, and Business Supply Chains: The Need for Governance
and Legal Frameworks to Achieve Sustainability, SSRN 9 (May 13, 2018), available at: https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3205452.
42. Samuel Falkon, The Story of the DAO – Its History and Consequences, THE STARTUP (Dec. 24,
2017), available at: https://medium.com/swlh/the-story-of-the-dao-its-history-and-consequences-71e6
a8a551ee.
43. Id.
44. Bacon et al., supra note 7, at 34-35. Ethereum classic, like Ethereum from which it split, is a public
blockchain. See https://ethereumclassic.org/ (last visited on April 19, 2019).
45. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The
DAO (July 25, 2017), available at: https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf; Jay Clay-
ton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11,
2017), available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11.
46. Falkon, supra note 44.
47. This is not to be confused by the question whether the blockchain itself is public or private (which
has nothing to do with whether the entity establishing it is public or private). On a Public blockchain
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leading efforts to introduce blockchain technology into state infrastructure by ex-
perimenting with blockchain-based data registries, land registries, and official e-
currencies (and more).48
A new generation of private blockchain entities also emerged in recent years,
promising to remedy the scalability and pace problems that were associated with
transactions on Bitcoin and Ethereum.49 These include the NEO, EOS and IOTA,
to name a few.50 We have yet to see how they perform, but some of them are already
exhibiting a more mature approach towards blockchain’s limitations and fallibility,
and, consequently, are embracing the need to think systematically about online dis-
pute resolution.51
B. Principal Characteristics
Blockchain is premised on several core features, all of which work together to
allow for the coordinated and decentralized creation of a secure and anonymous
database of transactions. To achieve this end, blockchain technology is premised
on the following characteristics: it is decentralized, it is immutable, and it is anon-
ymous.52 While, as we describe below, these traits are typically seen as essential to
blockchain, in reality the degree to which they exist has varied. Belowwe elaborate
on these issues by addressing the following questions: How do each of these char-
acteristics contribute to the nature of blockchain? How do these characteristics in-
teract with one another? And to what degree are these characteristics inherent to
blockchain?
1. Decentralization
Blockchain is premised on the idea of removing the middleman and allowing
for transactions to be executed and documented in a decentralized and distributed
fashion.53 This is achieved by distributing the functions that were performed in the
past by a single entity, such as a bank, to multiple actors (e.g., users, nodes and
anyone can access and propose transactions, anyone can contribute computing power and broadcast net-
work data, and all transactions are broadcast publicly. In a private blockchain, on the other hand, only
safelisted participants can join the network, contribute computing power, and contribute to the data. See
Bacon et al., supra note 7, at 25-26; Vitalik Buterin, On Public and Private Blockchains, ETHEREUM:
BLOG (Aug. 6, 2015), available at: https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-private-block-
chains/.
48. Neally & Hodge, supra note 4, at 5-7.
49. Buterin, On Public and Private Blockchains, supra note 49. Buterin stated in his blog: “Given all
of this, it may seem like private blockchains are unquestionably a better choice for institutions.” Id. See
also Marc Pilkington, Blockchain Technology: Principles and Applications, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ONDIGITALTRANSFORMATIONS 225, 225-26 (F. Xavier Olleros &Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016); MANAV
GUPTA, BLOCKCHAIN FORDUMMIES 14, 17 (2d ed., 2018); Scott A. McKinney et al., Smart Contracts,
Blockchain, and the Next Frontier of Transaction Law, 13 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 313 (2018).
50. Sulkowski, supra note 43; Simon Boehme & Amy Wan, Summary of Proposed EOS Dispute
Resolution Services (Dec. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
51. AmyWan, EOS Shows Transparency is Essential in Resolving Smart Contract Disputes, MEDIUM
(June 22, 2018), available at: https://medium.com/sagewise/eos-shows-transparency-is-essential-in-re-
solving-smart-contract-disputes-6755b19312d1.
52. GUPTA, supra note 5, at 18-19; Valentina Gatteschi et al., Blockchain and Smart Contracts for
Insurance: Is the Technology Mature Enough?, FUTURE INTERNET (2018); Wright & De Filippi, supra
note 5, at 2, 13, 20.
53. Id. at 2.
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miners), and allowing users to perform each of these roles (if they have the techno-
logical skills and the required hardware).54 Specifically, in standard monetary
transactions, it is our bank that verifies our identity and the fact that we have the
funds we committed to transfer and is also the entity documenting that such transfer
takes place. In a bitcoin transaction, on the other hand, it is the joint efforts of
miners and nodes that ensure that the individual transferring funds does indeed have
them, that the correct person receives the funds, and that the transaction is recorded
and documented so that the record kept on all computers is identical.55
By distributing power and authority among millions of computers, blockchain
technology assumes that there is no one entity that can be corrupted or attacked.56
These traits also safeguard against intermediaries’ negligence or incompetence in
performing their role, guaranteeing the accuracy of the account of transactions.57
By having multiple copies of the ledger saved on numerous computers, there is no
one source that can be attacked or revised.58 In addition, the verification of trans-
actions by miners who have to be diligent in solving the hash puzzle and the review
of the solution to the puzzle by the other miners assures the accuracy of the trans-
actions.59 The consensus protocol serves to ensure that multiple, distributed copies
of the ledger result in a single authoritative ledger, documenting the transactions,
which are transparent and publicly available, thus allowing for broad monitoring.60
2. Immutability
Blockchain ledgers are touted as being immutable; once blocks are approved,
the chain of data is assembled and becomes irreversible.61 Where other types of
databases could be altered or manipulated, here, we are told, the log created is stable
and unchangeable.62
In those cases where smart contracts are entered into, the immutability is also
connected with the execution of transactions, as the covenants or agreements that
are typically subject to interpretation and discretion are documented in code and
result in automatic, non-discretionary execution.63 Execution typically results in
the transfer of assets, data or funds, and is recorded, becoming part of the immutable
ledger.64 The unequivocal outcome promises to ensure performance and eliminate
uncertainty.65 Indeed, this quality, which is associated with blockchain, is part of
54. Gatteschi et al., supra note 54, at 2-3.
55. Id. at 3; Richard M. Weber, An Advisor’s Introduction to Blockchain, 72 J. FIN. SERV. PROF’LS
49, 50 (2018); Pilkington, supra note 51.
56. Wright & De Filippi, supra note 5, at 5-6.
57. McKinney et al., supra note 51, at 316-17.
58. MIT Technology Review Editors, A Glossary of Blockchain Jargon, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 23,
2018), available at: https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610885/a-glossary-of-blockchain-jargon/.
59. Wright & De Filippi, supra note 5, at 7, 21-22.
60. Gatteschi et al., supra note 54, at 3.
61. Weber, supra note 57, at 50.
62. Id. at 51.
63. Gatteschi et al., supra note 54, at 4-5.
64. Id.
65. McKinney et al., supra note 51, at 316.
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what makes this setting “trustless;” it allows for absolute strangers, often anony-
mous or pseudonymous parties, to engage with one another, transact and transfer
funds, with all such interactions being documented immutably.66
3. Anonymity
Blockchain allows for anonymous and pseudonymous exchanges. This is made
possible while ensuring the security and integrity of data by using private key en-
cryption.67 Such encryption allows for the verification of the identity of the person
involved. While anonymization is often critiqued as tolerating illegal activities to
take place,68 the obfuscation of identity is significant on blockchain for several rea-
sons.
First, anonymity ensures that miners and nodes do not take parties’ identity into
account when verifying a block.69 Second, if identity is disclosed on a public block-
chain, the data that can be accumulated on any given individual using the block-
chain can be extensive and sensitive. Since a blockchain is immutable, the potential
harm to individual privacy is substantial.70 Finally, as governments are increasingly
doing away with cash payments, the cryptocurrency arena may provide a space in
which individuals can spend money without disclosing their identity and incurring
a cost to their individual privacy.71 Those in favor of anonymity recognize the
problematic implications for criminal activity, but believe that the benefits outweigh
the challenges, and advocate that crime be dealt with through measures other than
eliminating the possibility of making private transactions through blockchain.72
These three basic qualities of blockchain—decentralization, immutability
and anonymity—all work together and reinforce each another to create the delicate
balance that allows for the removal of intermediaries. Trust in entities and individ-
uals is substituted with fixed processes, complex cryptography and immutable doc-
umentation.73 At the same time, a close look at those blockchain entities that are
already in operation reveals that these qualities are less absolute than they are typi-
cally described, and reality is often more nuanced than it appears at first blush.
C. Governance and Dispute Resolution
Blockchain has become synonymous with a decentralized structure for the im-
mutable documentation of information gathered in anonymous (or pseudonymous)
transactions. At the same time, the governance structure behind blockchain entities
often reveals that these qualities are less pronounced than they are touted to be. For
one, blockchain governance can be more centralized, providing a key role to core
developers and miners, with less voice to users.74 This approach may indeed make
66. Alan Cohn, Travis West & Chelsea Parker, Smart After All: Blockchain, Smart Contracts, Para-
metric Insurance, and Smart Energy Grids, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 273, 279 (2017).
67. Pilkington, supra note 51, at 229-31.
68. Werbach, supra note 11, at 491, 526; Witte, supra note 23, at 4.
69. Pilkington, supra note 51, at 229-30; McKinney et al., supra note 51, at 319-20.
70. GUPTA, supra note 51, at 20; Gatteschi et al., supra note 54, at 8; Werbach, supra note 11, at 531.
71. Weber, supra note 57, at 51; see alsoWitte, supra note 23.
72. Werbach, supra note 11, at 526; Gatteschi et al., supra note 54, at 13.
73. Id., at 10; Wright & De Filippi, supra note 5, at 12.
74. McKinney et al., supra note 51, at 320.
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sense in an environment in which there is rapid technological advancement and un-
derstanding the issues at stake requires substantial technological knowledge, which
users may not have.75 This governance structure, associated among others with
Bitcoin, is termed “off chain governance” in that questions related to governance
(e.g., remuneration to miners, or software updates) are resolved off blockchain with
limited transparency towards users, who are typically less involved.76
Some of the decisions made as part of blockchain governance have to do with
“forking.” The idea behind forking is that when the consensus protocol does not
resolve contradictions between blocks recorded on different nodes, some nodes can
break off the chain and start their own separate ledger.77 They would share the same
past up to the point of breaking off, but continue different paths thereafter. This is
called a “hard fork.” Several high-profile cases have highlighted the ways in which
forking may detract from blockchain’s claims of decentralization and immutability,
but at the same time may have provided a much-needed avenue of redress in a set-
ting priding itself for not having anyone in control.78 One such well known incident
is the Ethereum hack mentioned above, where a coding error allowed a hacker to
drain $70 million from The DAO’s funds. In response, Ethereum’s software was
updated to prevent the hacker from withdrawing the funds. Since this was done
with the support of the creator of Ethereum, a majority of users complied with the
change and updated the software.79 However, a minority refused to sacrifice the
immutable nature of the code and broke off to create “Ethereum Classic.” 80
Forking is used both as a dispute prevention and resolution mechanism. In
terms of dispute prevention, forking and the consensus protocol are used as part of
the operation of the blockchain to agree on which blocks to add to the chain.81 Usu-
ally this works, and nodes are able to agree on an identical log.82 Where a hacker
has jeopardized the integrity of the log, a hard fork can be used to “undo” the trans-
action and provide redress for those users who were harmed by the hacker. But this
results in a new dispute regarding the means for resolving the dispute, including the
deeper consequences of how problems are handled on blockchain: who gets to de-
cide and what are the options for addressing such problems.
Another type of problem that can arise with respect to the integrity and immu-
tability of the record is the lack of distribution of computational power. In Bitcoin,
for example, all of the computational power is concentrated among a small number
of entities.83 This creates the risk of a “51% attack,” meaning that those controlling
over half of the computational power can decide to approve their own thread of
transactions, which will override other threads. The attack is possible because those
with more computational power will have more proof of work and therefore prevail
75. Avital Mentovich, J.J. Prescott & Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Is Implicit Bias Inevitable? Courts,
Technology and the Future of Impartiality 19-20 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
76. Bacon et al., supra note 7, at 24-25, 29, 103.
77. Weber, supra note 57, at 52.
78. Sulkowski, supra note 43, at 9.
79. Jakub J. Szczerbowski, Transaction Costs of Blockchain Smart Contracts, 16 L. & FORENSIC SCI.
1, 3 (2018); McKinney et al., supra note 51, at 321-23; Bartoletti & Pompianu, supra note 34; Bacon et
al., supra note 7, at 32.
80. Bacon et al., supra note 7, at 35, 102.
81. Id. at 20-21.
82. Id. at 12.
83. Bartoletti & Pompianu, supra note 34, at 4.
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according to the consensus protocol.84 While this was considered a theoretical risk
in the past, these attacks have become more frequent, especially with respect to
small coins that have attracted fewer miners where computational power is easier
to control. There have been technological solutions put forth to address this prob-
lem,85 but the message seems to be a deeper one. From both the forking and 51%
incidents we see that immutability is a design choice that comes at a cost; in some
instances, reversing transactions might actually increase trust in the system, as was
the case with the Ethereum hack.86 Also, the 51% attack demonstrates that all sys-
tems are vulnerable. While these vulnerabilities can be detected over time and ad-
dressed, a new vulnerability will ultimately surface. Often these vulnerabilities
emerge in the form of disputes, and the existence of dispute resolution avenues can
assist not only in addressing particular disputes, but in preventing future problems
from arising by providing a broader, more systemic solution.
On-chain governance means that decisions on how to run the blockchain are
reached through online voting, representing a modern version of direct democ-
racy.87 EOS is one example of such a governance structure, where voting results
are governed by software and executed automatically.88 The development of on-
chain governance was, to a large extent, a response to the problems and forking-
type solutions that unmoored the blockchain environment in the last few years.89
While these new structures have been accompanied by problems of their own, they
have also recognized the need for addressing disputes, by setting up an arbitration
body.90 The arbitration body assembled by EOS reached a decision that drew much
attention where it decided to freeze a transaction suspected as fraudulent, and return
the funds. This decision was criticized, among other things, for the lack of trans-
parency of the operation of the arbitrator, and its centralized character, both which
challenged the arbitration body’s legitimacy.91
Aside from governance-related issues, other problems can (and do) arise be-
tween the transacting parties themselves regarding the execution and interpretation
of smart contracts, or between users and their “wallets,” which are new intermedi-
aries that operate in this environment to provide users with storage services for their
cryptocurrency.92 Parties may, for example, dispute the amount of money they have
in their wallet, or, as often happens, may lose their password and be unable to access
84. Bacon et al., supra note 4, at 46 (showing that this concern just materialized recently). See also
Mike Orcutt,Once Hailed as Unhackable, Blockchains Are Now Getting Hacked, MITTECH. REV. (Feb.
19, 2019), available at: https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612974/once-hailed-as-unhackable-block-
chains-are-now-getting-hacked/.
85. See, e.g., Alyssa Hertig, Blockchain’s Once-Feared 51% Attack Is Now Becoming Regular,
COINDESK (June 8, 2018), available at: https://www.coindesk.com/blockchains-feared-51-attack-now-
becoming-regular.
86. Werbach, supra note 11, at 550-51.
87. Id.; Gatteschi et al., supra note 54, at 9.
88. ECAF Rules of Dispute Resolution, ECAF, https://eoscorearbitration.io/home/governance/ (last
visited Feb. 25, 2019) [hereinafter ECAF Rules of Dispute Resolution].
89. SeeWerbach, supra note 11, at 548-49.
90. Id. at 547-48.
91. Wan, supra note 53.
92. Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, The New New Courts, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 165, 176 (2017);
Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Avital Mentovich, Right of Access and Access to Justice in the Courts of the
21st Century 4, 7-8 (forthcoming 2019).
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their e-wallet.93 Complex questions relating to the ability to inherit cryptocurren-
cies arise when family members do not have access to the deceased’s password.94
All of these problems need to be addressed in a systematic and structured way by
providing dispute resolution avenues. Indeed, EOS’s arbitration system has been
flooded with many of these types of disputes but has yet to provide effective redress
for parties.95 In the following section we describe the emergence of online dispute
resolution mechanisms some twenty years ago in the e-commerce setting and the
more recent attempts to introduce such processes into the blockchain arena.
III. ONLINEDISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR BLOCKCHAIN
A. ODR, Some Background
Large scale online dispute resolution (ODR) processes emerged in the 1990s.
As the ban on commercial activity on the internet was lifted, the population of users
increased rapidly, and number of disputes grew.96 The internet had been invented
in 1969 but for more than twenty years, users had been few and were located either
at universities or in the military. Domain names, which were worthless at the be-
ginning of the 1990s became by 2000, both valuable, and the subject of growing
numbers of disputes.
The rapid growth of e-commerce disputes online could be attributed to several
factors. For one, transactions occurred between strangers, often from different
countries and cultures, who had to overcome linguistic, cultural and legal differ-
ences.97 In addition, the fast pace of internet communication and the thin nature of
interaction and communication were often fertile ground for misunderstandings and
escalation.98 Finally, complexity and innovation inevitably generate problems, and
the online arena at that time was both innovative and complex.99
Given the nature of these disputes, traditional avenues of dispute resolution—
courts and their alternatives—both of which required physical presence, were not a
viable solution for the vast majority of online disputes. These were disputes over
low sums of money in which parties were physically distant from one another, and
could not be resolved face-to-face. However, it turned out that the very technology
that made traditional dispute resolution processes inaccessible, could also provide
the basis for developing new, innovative and accessible avenues of redress. These
processes were what we now term ODR, and initially were online equivalents of
traditional alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes, such as negotiation, me-
diation and arbitration. 100
93. Witte, supra note 23, at 2-3.
94. Gatteschi et al., supra note 54, at 3-4.
95. TELEGRAM, https://t.me/eosarb (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (public chat room for discussing the
EOS Blockchain system).
96. Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 94, at 187-88; see also Rabinovich-Einy & Mentovich, su-
pra note 94, at 9, 11-12.
97. Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 94, at 187-88.
98. Id. at 169; Rabinovich-Einy & Mentovich, supra note 94, at 19-20.
99. Rabinovich-Einy& Katsh, supra note 94, at 167-69, 171. See also Rabinovich-Einy&Mentovich,
supra note 94, at 9-10, 16, 19, 21-22.
100. Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 94, at 176-78, 181, 212; seeRabinovich-Einy&Mentovich,
supra note 94, at 3-4, 6.
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Over time, ODR providers came to appreciate the opportunities embedded in
the new medium and shifted their focus from trying to mimic familiar processes
from the offline setting to developing new processes which presented new opportu-
nities for addressing conflict. These new opportunities emerged from the unique
qualities of ODR: it was offered online, it relied on the intelligence of the machine
(the “fourth party”), and it created a digital trail.101 These characteristics made ODR
much more accessible and efficient and, being freed of the limitations of human
capacity and in-person meetings, allowed ODR processes to handle extremely large
numbers of disputes. In fact, eBay’s ODR system is able to handle the unfathoma-
ble number of 60 million disputes a year.102
But beyond the added efficiency and capacity, the shift to ODR also opened up
opportunities for enhancing fairness and justice. Through appropriate design and
careful study of dispute resolution data, processes could be made more accessible
to, and understandable by, parties belonging to traditionally disempowered groups,
offering them structured language and menus with prescribed options, as well as
allowing them time to phrase their responses, and consult with an expert.103
Whether these new opportunities will result in increased voice and just outcomes is
yet to be seen, but there is some indication that appropriate design and ongoing
monitoring could help overcome some of the traditional dispute resolution world’s
most entrenched problems.104 Also intriguing are the new opportunities for using
the dispute resolution data that is automatically captured in ODR to learn about the
sources of recurring disputes and engage in dispute prevention—activity designed
to prevent such problems from recurring without waiting for a complaint by the
aggrieved party. A proactive approach to dispute prevention therefore could im-
prove redress for parties who fail to complain, often those belonging to social
groups most affected by financial and other barriers that stand in the way of airing
disputes.105
During the last few decades, ODR’s reach has extended beyond e-commerce
and disputes generated online in interactions on private platforms to the public sec-
tor and disputes that arise in the face to face context. ODR is no longer a last resort,
used for low value disputes between strangers where courts and ADR are unavaila-
ble, but is often the first choice for those individuals whose lives are increasingly
taking place online in a broad range of settings, in their disputes with individuals,
companies, and public entities.106
It should come as no surprise that the blockchain setting, used most commonly
for cryptocurrency transactions, would become a candidate for ODR. In the fol-
lowing section, we describe some of the leading enterprises developing ODR for
blockchain and smart contracts, highlighting commonalities across the various plat-
forms, as well as some of the distinct features of each of these entities.
101. Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 94, at 168-69; Rabinovich-Einy & Mentovich, supra note
94, at 15-16.
102. Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 94, at 168-69, 187, 201; Rabinovich-Einy & Mentovich,
supra note 94, at 15-16.
103. Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 94, at 203; Rabinovich-Einy & Mentovich, supra note 94,
at 17, 21-22.
104. Rabinovich-Einy & Mentovich, supra note 94, at 17, 21-22.
105. Id. at 17-18; Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 94, at 209.
106. Rabinovich-Einy & Mentovich, supra note 94, at 10, 12, 17-19.
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B. Emergence of ODR Mechanisms for Blockchain
Despite early promises for a dispute-free environment in which transactions are
irreversible and executed automatically, eventually it began to be asked “what about
dispute resolution?”107 Experience with blockchain-based endeavors in recent
years has shown that blockchain, as any other area of human engagement in a rap-
idly evolving complex setting, is bound to generate misunderstandings, conflict and
unforeseen circumstances. Within a few years, entrepreneurs started seeing the po-
tential of ODR for the blockchain arena, because ODR is conducted online from
afar, and allows for flexible design and a global reach. Below is a description of
some of the principal systems and processes that emerged in the last couple of years
for blockchain dispute resolution.108
1. Kleros
The Kleros “arbitration” system is meant to address smart contract-related dis-
putes.109 The Kleros process can be activated once a dispute arises in the execution
of a smart contract, freezing fund transfers under the smart contract until the conflict
is resolved.110 For this to occur, the parties must pre-select Kleros as a dispute
resolution provider in their smart contract and agree upon some basic features of
the resolution process—the Kleros sub-court in which the dispute will be addressed,
the number of jurors, etc.111
The design of the dispute resolution system developed by Kleros emulates
some of the characteristics of the design of the blockchain environment. Kleros is
premised on crowdsourcing—using the wisdom of the crowds—and game the-
ory.112 The resolution itself is reached through jury voting.113 Jury members are
incentivized to participate and to vote together with the majority through a mecha-
nism similar to the “Schelling Token.”114 The funds for covering the jurors’ pay
must be deposited for the dispute resolution process to commence. Parties need to
agree as to who bears the costs; the system is agnostic to whether one of the parties,
all parties, or a third party pays.115 If a party believes the contract was breached, he
or she needs to approach Kleros and send it all evidence (secured through public
key encryption).
Jury members are anonymous and nominate themselves. Therefore, incentives
need to be put in place to ensure that such anonymous jurors resolve the dispute in
a fair and honest manner. This goal is realized through the use of tokens and a
107. 10 Things Blockchain Isn’t, CRYPTO BEGINNERS, https://www.cryptobeginners.info/blog/10-
things-blockchain-isnt/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
108. Descriptions are mostly based on information contained in these enterprises’ white papers, web-
sites, and, in some cases, on interviews conducted with their founders.
109. The Blockchain Dispute Resolution Layer, KLEROS, https://kleros.io/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
110. Id.
111. Federico Ast, Kleros, A Protocol for a Decentralized Justice System, MEDIUM (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://medium.com/kleros/kleros-a-decentralized-justice-protocol-for-the-internet-38d596a6300d.
112. KLEROS, supra note 111.
113. Id.; Ast, supra note 113.
114. Clement Lesaege & Federico Ast, Teaching with Technology White Paper 1 (2018),
https://kleros.io/assets/whitepaper.pdf.
115. Id. at 7-8.
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random jury selection process.116 As jurors sign up they start off in the general
court and are then assigned to specific sub-courts (e.g., e-commerce, insurance,
transport) based on their credentials.117 Each sub-court has its own rules and re-
quirements regarding costs, number of jurors, and number of active tokens re-
quired.118 Each token owner can sign up to a maximum of one sub-court in which
they have an activated token and in this way they are incentivized to sign up to the
sub-court which handles matters in which they have the most expertise.119 Each
juror is paid for her work and therefore has an economic interest to serve as a juror.
In order to vote, the juror is required to deposit a token termed “PNK.”120 The more
tokens a juror deposits, the more likely she is to be selected as a juror.121 The num-
ber of times a juror has been selected determines the number of votes the juror re-
ceive as well as the number of tokens he or she will gain or lose with the redistri-
bution of tokens after the jurors have voted (gain and loss are determined depending
on whether the juror has voted with the majority of jurors or not).122 Since inactive
jurors do not deposit tokens, they cannot be selected. Also, tokens play a crucial
role in preventing fraud and attempts to influence the outcome of the case.123
Each contract details the voting options for the jurors as well as what would be
the operative consequences of voting for each of the options (transfer of funds,
etc.).124 Jurors receive the evidence, weigh it and reach a decision in accordance
with the rules of the particular court in which the case is being decided (parameters
such as time to resolution, voting options and possibilities for communication with
the parties vary across courts).125 After weighing the evidence, jurors commit to
voting for one of the parties and must justify their decision. Voting is performed
through a hash that contains the vote, salt (a random figure that enhances random-
ness), and an Ethereum address of the juror so as to make each juror’s vote unique
and prevent fraud among jurors.126 Once jurors have made a decision, they may not
alter their vote, but their decision, at this point, is still concealed from the other
jurors. After voting has ended, each juror reveals his or her vote and salt, and a
Kleros smart contract verifies that this indeed matches the manner in which the juror
voted.127 Jurors who do not reveal their vote are punished twice as much as they
would be for voting incoherently.128 Only after all jurors have put in their votes and
their voting has been verified, will the votes become transparent so that jurors will
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id. at. 10.
118. Id.
119. Id. Requiring jurors to choose between subcourts incentivizes them to choose the subcourts they
are the most qualified for. If they were able to choose every subcourt, there would be a concern that
some would choose all of them to maximize their arbitration fees from their tokens.
120. Lesaege &Ast, supra note 116, at 4.
121. Id. at 4, 9. Theoretically, it is possible for the same juror to be selected twice for a single dispute,
but such a scenario is highly unlikely.
122. Id. at 5.
123. Id. at 8. Coins protect the system against malicious attacks and provide proper incentives for jurors.
If jurors were simply drawn randomly, a malicious party could create a large number of addresses to be
drawn several times per each dispute. In addition, pinakion provides jurors with an incentive to vote
honestly by making incoherent jurors pay part of their deposit to coherent ones.
124. Id. at 4.
125. Ast, supra note 113.
126. Lesaege &Ast, supra note 116, at 6-7.
127. Id. at 7.
128. Id. at 8-9.
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not influence or be influenced by other jurors’ decisions.129 All votes are counted
and the smart contract will be executed in accordance with the decision that repre-
sents the highest number of votes.130 Tokens will be redistributed among the jurors
depending on whether they voted with the majority or not. The assumption is that
whomever did not vote with the majority either signed up for a sub-court in which
they have insufficient expertise, did not weigh the evidence properly, or did not
attempt to reach an accurate decision (were bribed).131
Parties may appeal the decision (several times!); each time the number of jurors
will be doubled plus one. The party appealing the decision will need to deposit the
funds to cover the appeal. Since costs grow exponentially with the increase in the
number of jurors, this is expected to inhibit parties from appealing repetitively.132
The final decision is automatically enforced as part of the smart contract, as is the
payment for the cost of the arbitration (borne by the losing party).133
Kleros offers a rights-based dispute resolution process, which results in a bi-
nary, dichotomous resolution in favor of one party and against the other. The pro-
cess by which such resolution is reached is one that aggregates the votes of a large
crowd of jurors, who are operating within a structure that aims to ensure the integ-
rity of the voting process through a tokenized incentive structure and additional
measures. As we shall see, these principles shape several of the endeavors in the
blockchain ODR sphere, perhaps because the elements that underlie this approach
resemble some of the basic notions that have given rise to blockchain technology—
the desire for more democratic and decentralized decision making, and for auto-
matic enforcement of decisions reached.
2. Juris
Juris offers an open code dispute resolution system using blockchain and Juris
tokens (JRS).134 The Juris framework operates where the parties adopted the Juris
code in their smart contract. Once a dispute arises, the parties can freeze the con-
tract and access the system through the Juris dashboard. The parties are referred to
a multi-step dispute resolution process, starting with “SELF Mediation”—a selec-
tion of tools, including mediation, that can help parties reach a consensual agree-
ment.135
If parties are unable to resolve the dispute through consensual processes, they
can turn to a “SNAP” (Simple Neutral Arbitrator Pool) judgment.136 SNAP is a
129. Ast, supra note 113.
130. Id.
131. See generally Lesaege & Ast, supra note 116.
132. Furthermore, there are incentives for jurors to provide reasoned decisions that would further in-
hibit appeals. See id. at 8 (stating that “If a verdict is appealed, jurors of the appealed level are not paid.
(but they are still affected by the dispute due to token redistribution). This incentivizes jurors to give
explanations of their rulings. When proper explanations are given, parties are less likely to appeal as
they have more chance to be convinced that a decision is fair”).
133. Id.
134. Teaching with TechnologyWhite Paper 27White Paper Version 2.0, JURIS JURIS3 (Sept.. 18, 2018),
available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1318klGEYL4g02VudL-C-BCnvpKujTnbF/view.
135. Id. at 16-17.
136. Id. at 17.
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process through which parties receive a judgment by neutral jurors who anony-
mously vote on the case.137 The group of jurors also provides a brief opinion on the
case.138 After receiving the jurors’ decision, the parties may return to the SELF
stage and reach a consensual agreement.139 During this phase the parties have a
timeframe for supplying necessary details regarding the case, after which the case
brief is sent to jurors with JRS tokens, for review.140 As part of their vote, jurors
are required to provide one of three justifications as well as a brief reasoning.141 All
judgements remain concealed until the deadline for submission. After this time the
information becomes public and a discussion among SNAP jurors ensues, and legal
experts actively participate by asking questions, providing relevant information and
justifications.142 Following this stage, another vote takes place, with jurors justify-
ing their votes and providing reasoning.143 Following the vote, each legal expert is
assigned to a consensus group and each group forms a “final opinion.” These opin-
ions are transferred to the parties, and they can rely on them in returning to the
consensual tools.144
Finally, the binding PANEL (Preemptory Agreement for Neutral Expert Liti-
gation) judgment stage is meant for complex disputes that require the input of the
most experienced jurors (High Jurists) or for those disputes in which parties would
like to reach a legally binding award under the N.Y. Convention.145 While this
avenue is more costly than SNAP, it can provide parties with an award that is not
only legally binding but enforceable worldwide. All materials from the SNAP
phase will be available for the jurists at this stage and the decision makers may
request additional information before rendering their decision. The decision must
be reached within thirty days and once rendered, the smart contract between the
parties will be rescinded, and the award will be automatically enforced.146
The system engages jurors of three levels—high jurists, good standing jurists
and novice jurists.147 High jurists are professional arbitrators with experience on
the platform. They decide the lengthiest cases, which are the most rewarding. Good
standing jurists are jurors who contribute to the platform and can vote on SNAP
cases. They can advance to the rank of high jurist by obtaining higher ratings. Nov-
ice jurists are new users who can participate in discussions and evaluate SNAP but
cannot decide cases. Juris has a reputational system for jurors, which evaluates the
quality of their decision making.148
Juris, as we can see, employs tokenized juror voting, but also leaves room for
consensual party to party dispute resolution efforts, structuring a tiered resolution




140. JURIS, supra note 136, at 30.
141. Id. at 31.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 16-17.
145. Id. at 33.
146. JURIS, supra note 136, at 34.
147. Id. at 18.
148. Id. at 41.
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3. Jur
Jur’s dispute resolution mechanism is premised on the creation of a decentral-
ized voting system that draws on the wisdom of the crowds and tokenization. Users
use tokens for voting and are encouraged to align their votes with what they predict
the majority vote will be.149 There are different types of smart contracts that can be
used, structuring differently who can vote and how such vote is structured.150
Blockchain technology is used to process the votes and tokens are used to incentiv-
ize voters to vote in line with what they predict will constitute the majority vote.151
There are two modes of voting for resolving disputes—open and closed voting.
Open votes are employed where no expertise is required. In such a vote, all token-
holding users may evaluate the case and vote.152 Those voters who voted early
enough to generate a majority vote and voted in line with such majority vote will
receive the tokens of those voters who were in the minority.153 Minority voters are
sanctioned by losing their tokens to those voters who predicted the direction in
which the majority of votes would sway.154
As we can see, the incentive structure is such that rational voters are supposed
to vote only when their confidence level in their ability to predict the majority vote
exceeds fifty percent.155 Voting is transparent and Jur employs various mechanisms
to ensure that such transparency does not thwart the incentive structure, such as
placing a cap on the gap between the majority and minority votes (as a function of
the percentage of votes cast).156 Since voters would like to gain tokens and avoid a
loss, it is expected that in those instances in which expertise is required, only voters
who possess such expertise will participate in the vote.157 This layer of voting re-
quires no fee, but the complainant must put forth a stake of one percent or more of
the value of the contract when setting forth their proposal for resolution.158 If the
complainant receives the majority of the votes, then the stake will be returned to
him or her and he or she will receive an award.159 If, on the other hand, the com-
plainant is in the minority, then his or her voting stake will be lost and passed on to
the majority voters.160 It is presumed that the incentive structure motivates voters
to cast their vote to promote a fair and just resolution at zero cost.161
The cases that are resolved in a closed vote (“closed hub”) are those that require
expertise and involve a legal question.162 A hub is a closed setting in which only
JUR token-holders with special expertise or qualifications may vote.163 An admin
sets up the hub and determines the precise voting process, including the required
149. Id.
150. Id. at 16.
151. Id. at 8-9.
152. JURIS, supra note 136, at 15.
153. Id. at 44.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 45.
157. Id. at 60-61.
158. JURIS, supra note 136, at 45.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 53.
162. Id. at 21.
163. Id. at 48.
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number of votes.164 Any user can create a hub, but it is the complainant’s preroga-
tive whether to use the open layer or a closed hub for the resolution of their dis-
pute.165 Only voters with tokens stored in wallets that are attached to the hub may
participate in a closed vote.166 Naturally, the closed nature of the hub setting and
the smaller number of participants, make the hubs more vulnerable to fraud, manip-
ulation, or the influence of concentrated power. Therefore, the admin may deter-
mine a maximum number of tokens per participant, and each voter’s maximal num-
ber of tokens cannot exceed a maximal portion of the overall number of tokens in
the hub.167 In addition, the rules place a cap on the value of the disputed amount in
relation to the number of tokens participating in the vote so as to ensure that the risk
associated with the vote does not exceed the value of the prize.168
In summary, through its reliance on the two options for tokenized voting en-
tered into by the parties to the dispute through smart contracts, Jur believes it is able
to create an “unbreakable voting system,”169 a system that is decentralized, whose
outcome can be automatically enforced without having to resort to courts.
4. Aragon
Aragon draws on dispute resolution mechanisms as a means of consensual gov-
ernance of a decentralized app. Aragon’s ANT tokens allow their holders to vote
on the future development of the app, making the establishment and operation of a
decentralized body simpler and smoother on the blockchain.170
The idea is for parties to deposit collateral for the execution of the smart con-
tract between the parties, and create mechanisms for the resolution of disputes in
the form of digital adjudication.171 Aragon’s court, much like national courts, will
have jurisdiction over those organizations that have entered into smart contracts on
the Aragon platform.172 Past decisions will be fed into an archive and the expecta-
tion is that over time the jurors will gain reputational credit and their decisions will
become more consistent.173
In order to become a juror, one must agree to a code of conduct, which refers
to instances in which one or both parties try to influence the voting process.174
When initiating a claim, the complainant’s fees are a function of the overall reputa-
tion of the jurors voting on the case.175 The procedure begins with the parties sub-
mitting statements and evidence. There is a ruling phase where the claim may be
rejected immediately, or the jurors may decide that the contract should be updated,
or that collateral should be re-allocated between the parties, or that the claim should
be flagged for further review for foul play by one or more of the parties.176 These
164. JURIS, supra note 136, at 44.
165. Id. at 48.
166. Id. at 49.
167. Id. at 48.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 8.
170. ARAGON, https://aragon.org/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
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decisions are reached by majority vote of the jurors.177 If at least one juror chooses
the latter option, then jurors selected from the review court will review the conduct
of the jurors who did not flag the case, to see whether there has been any foul play
and the jurors failed to report one or more of the parties, contrary to their obliga-
tions.178 The outcome of the review can be either a finding that the case was wrong-
fully flagged, that the case was rightly flagged and the claim is rejected because
both parties attempted to bribe the jurors, or that the case was rightly flagged and
the case will be decided in favor of the party who did not attempt to bribe the ju-
rors.179 If the jurors did not flag parties who tried to bribe them, they will lose their
reputation.180 Parties may appeal, but for each appeal the overall weight of the
jurors’ reputation must be doubled.181
Here, as in other cases, jurors vote on disputes in a tokenized system that in-
corporates various incentive structures to ensure that the voting process is fair. Ara-
gon also sends a clear message to jurors as to what is expected of them through the
code of conduct they commit to. An enforcement mechanism which draws on the
prisoner’s dilemma works alongside the code in driving jurors to report bribery at-
tempts by parties.
5. Sagewise
Sagewise offers a technological infrastructure for addressing disputes related
to smart contracts. The platform draws on blockchain technology, dispute resolu-
tion, and cryptocurrencies, to offer a product that freezes the execution of a flawed
smart contract (e.g., coding error, security issues, contract does not reflect parties’
wishes) and allows for a dispute resolution process to take place.182 The application
can be applied to a wide variety of smart contracts, including supply contracts, fi-
nancial contracts, contracts relating to digitized assets, and consumer contracts.183
The mechanism through which Sagewise is employed is quite straightforward.
Parties are required to include in their smart contract the “Sagewise SDK,” a coded
contractual clause which is the equivalent of the traditional dispute resolution
clause.184 The Sagewise SDK performs three important functions—it activates the
dispute resolution process, it freezes the smart contract, and it ultimately allows for
the enforcement of any resolution reached through its contract upgrade feature.185
Sagewise operates as a facilitator through the SDK, where it can allow a delay
in the smart contract around certain functions, so as to allow the parties to com-
municate through text or email to ensure that their expectations are met.186 When
the contract is generated, time locked periods (sometimes referred to as “road





182. James Sower, Sagewise Pioneers Dispute Resolution for Smart Contracts, ICO CROWD (July 21,
2018), http://icocrowd.com/sagewise-pioneers-dispute-resolution-for-smart-contracts/.
183. JD Alois, Sagewise Pitches Dispute Digital Resolution Protocol for Blockchain Based Smart Con-
tracts, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.crowdfundinsid.er.com/2018/02/128595-sag
ewise-pitches-dispute-digital-resolution-protocol-blockchain-based-smart-contracts/.
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bumps”) can be created around key activities (“key code points”) so as to allow the
parties to verify the code and its impact.187 An additional layer of protection is
offered for those instances in which an unexpected dispute arises regarding a coding
error or some other unforeseen event, and allows for freezing the smart contract.188
A combination of freezing the contract, time blocks, and alerts which warn the users
from continued execution of the contract allow the parties to prevent its execution
prior to the occurrence of the impending default.189
Beyond freezing the smart contract, the Sagewise product allows the parties to
amend the contract and resolve the dispute through a resolution process conducted
via a smart contract. By pressing the SDK button on their mobile app, parties can
activate a dispute resolution process.190 As a first step, parties are given an oppor-
tunity to resolve the dispute on their own by amending the code, changing the terms
of the contract and the like. This interaction takes place while the execution of the
smart contract has been put on hold and, if they are successful, they can amend the
contract and proceed with its execution.191 Otherwise, the smart contract will move
on to the next phase involving a human third-party facilitator, and expert advice on
choosing a dispute resolution provider among those offered through Sagewise.192
This stage involves payment with Sagewise tokens by the complainant. Sagewise
does not itself provide dispute resolution services, it serves as a gateway to what
will be in the future a marketplace of ODR providers.193 Parties may agree in ad-
vance on a particular provider, and may also change their initial selection should,
for example, such provider no longer be active. The dispute resolution provider
may also reject the acceptance of a given dispute under certain circumstances.
Where it has accepted the dispute, such provider is granted full control over the
smart contract, and therefore the resolution reached through the provider can be
optimized and seamlessly enforced by creating a new smart contract.194 To enjoy
continued access to, and control over, the smart contracts on Sagewise, the dispute
resolution providers will have to deposit Sagewise tokens.195
The various steps for dispute resolution can be defined as parameters on the
SDK, or the site default will prevail. Such parameters include “Resolution-
ServiceID,” which defines the selected dispute resolution provider, choice of law,
choice of process, language, and the like.196 “SelfDisputeResolutionEnabled”
states whether parties can attempt to resolve the dispute on their own under the
contract.197 The “ArgumentVotingTimeout” parameter determines the period of
time after which a party will be considered non-responsive to a resolution vote.198
187. ConsenSys/Smart-Contract-Best-Practices, GITHUB, github.com/ConsenSys/smart-contract-best
practices/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=speed%2Bbumps&type= (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
188. JURIS, supra note 136, at 13.
189. Legal Business Infrastructure for Blockchain & Smart Contracts (All Verticals), SAGEWISE, http
s://www.sagewise.io/use-cases/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
190. JURIS, supra note 136, at 4.
191. Id. at 12.
192. Id. at 20.
193. Id. at 2.
194. Id. at 22.
195. Id.
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And finally, the “CountActivationThreshold” parameter defines criteria for activat-
ing the dispute resolution function.199
In conclusion, Sagewise recognized the need for effective dispute resolution
and prevention in the blockchain setting and has developed the technical infrastruc-
ture to realize this goal. In its white paper, Sagewise envisions a future in which it
may expand beyond providing tools for dispute resolution to the realm of rulemak-
ing that will guide the crypto-community in structuring its transactions.
6. Mattereum
Mattereum is a smart contract enterprise whose mission is to allow for smart
contracts to cover physical assets by getting “real world assets on-chain.”200 To
that end, Mattereum has developed the “automated custodian” tool—a real world
asset’s legal owner and registrar.201 It also incorporates a dispute resolution process
premised on off-chain arbitration, relying on independent external arbitrators.202
Mattereum creates a variety of legal contracts and corresponding smart contracts so
as to facilitate common legal transactions, such as the sale, auction, and lease of
physical property, as well as the licensing of intellectual property.203 The parties
create a Ricardian contract, which allows for digital performance and uses cryptog-
raphy to record evidence of the contractual agreement.204
If a dispute arises, the parties can turn to arbitration, which is conducted by an
independent, external body.205 Parties can either choose arbitrators from options
provided to them, or, if they cannot agree, one will be assigned to them.206 The
costs of the arbitration are included in the fee paid as part of the audit of Mattereum
contracts, performed to locate flaws, areas of ambiguity and other potential prob-
lems.207 In this respect, Mattereum not only offers ex-post dispute resolution ser-
vices, but also engages in active ex-ante dispute prevention efforts.
Mattereum’s scope of operation is different than many of the other entities op-
erating in the domain involving blockchain and ODR for several reasons. For one,
it attempts to use blockchain for off-chain assets, an ambitious task that expands the
scope of disputes that could be handled through ODR for blockchain, much in the
same way that the offline-online distinction has become less relevant for ODR in
other contexts. Second, Mattereum opts for traditional arbitration as opposed to
crowd-sourced jury voting. While such a choice may have its advantages, it also
opens up questions regarding the ability to scale and handle mass disputes in the
future.
199. Id.
200. Vinay Gupta et al., Smart Contracts. Real Property. 2-3 (Mattereum, Working Paper), https://mat-
tereum.com/upload/iblock/af8/mattereum_workingpaper.pdf.
201. Id. at 2.
202. Id. at 20.
203. Id. at 16.
204. Id. at 9.
205. Id. at 20.
206. Gupta et al., supra note 202, at 20.
207. Id. at 39.
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7. RHUbarb
Rhubarb uses smart contracts and RHY tokens for enhancing access to justice
and new forms of democratic dispute resolution.208 RHUbarb has expertise in the
dispute resolution arena through its involvement with PeopleClaim, a large ODR
provider which focuses on using technology to improve the way dispute resolution
mechanisms operate, and to enhance access to justice.209 PeopleClaim has a large
community of users, allowing people to submit claims and have the community
resolve them based on the wisdom of the crowds.210 The process is public, and the
parties can invite experts (e.g., lawyers, doctors) from the community to offer feed-
back on their case.211
The RHUbarb mechanism has several layers. One possibility is to conduct
“poll verdicts.”212 Conducting polls is a quick, inexpensive and democratic avenue
for reaching decisions that are based on a broad consensus. Jurors whose vote was
in the minority will lose their tokens.213 The results of the poll can serve as a bind-
ing arbitral decision if the parties chose this option in advance.214 Otherwise, poll
results may assist parties’ negotiation or mediation efforts, or be submitted as expert
opinion in court or arbitration.215 There are also “self-funding processes” in which
jurors are rewarded for proposing a solution that the parties did not conceive of but
ultimately selected.216
As stated above, this endeavor benefits from its relationship with PeopleClaim,
which has experience with running an ODR platform and resolving disputes online.
With the introduction of RHY to PeopleClaim, incentives are enhanced for jurors
to both collaborate and innovate in proposing creative resolutions.217 RHUbarb is
interesting in that it connects to ODR processes outside the blockchain arena and
examines the ways in which blockchain technology can enhance those resolution
efforts that are already taking place online in various contexts, because of its ability
to crowdsource jurors and to provide incentives for fair voting through tokens and
other means. Like Sagewise and others, it also recognizes the need for consensual
processes to operate alongside decision-based ones, and the potential of juror voting
to assist in generating creative outcomes that extend beyond the win-lose paradigm.
208. Our Story, RHUBARB, https://www.rhucoin.com/our-story.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. PeopleClaim has helped over 60,000 businesses and consumers resolve disputes online with the
involvement of several thousands of legal professionals, industry domain experts, and consumers who
help resolve disputes on its site. Id.
212. Rhubarb Fund ICO—Pre-Sale White Paper, ICO CROWD 2, 8 (2018), https://www.rhucoin.co
m/Rhubarb-Fund-ICO-Overview.pdf.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 9.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 12.
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8. Jury Online
Jury Online is a platform that specializes in initial coin offerings (ICOs), bring-
ing together projects and investors and allowing them to transact through smart con-
tracts.218 Each project contains a detailed roadmap with milestones and timeframes.
The investment funds and the tokens are held in trust and are released to the parties
when milestones are met.219 After each milestone is met, there is a period of three
days during which parties may file a dispute regarding such step.220 If a dispute
arises as to the transaction, each party can turn to an arbitrator who is an expert in
the area and is selected at random to resolve their misunderstanding.221
There are a few rules guiding the process. First, only an investor with Jury
Online tokens may initiate a claim. Such claim can only be initiated during the time
frame created—the three-day period after having reached a milestone. The first
dispute is resolved free of charge for the investor.222 For additional dispute resolu-
tion there is a fee that can be paid using the tokens deposited in advance for the
purpose of covering these costs.223 If a dispute does not arise, these funds are re-
turned at the consummation of the transaction.224
Once a dispute is filed, the parties have some time for making claims and then
the materials are sent anonymously to a group of random arbitrators who decide the
case by majority vote within a given period of time.225 Parties can substitute the
unknown group of random jurors with an agreed-upon single arbitrator.226 All de-
cisions are subject to an appeal.227
Each of the arbitrators renders a decision in favor of either the operator or the
investor, without being exposed to the other arbitrators’ decisions (so as not to be
influenced by the majority), and encryption is used to prevent collusion by arbitra-
tors.228 Each arbitrator is rated on his or her decisions.229
Here, as in some of the other projects, blockchain ODR is used for the block-
chain context, in this case ICOs. The dispute resolution method draws on
crowdsourced jurors or traditional arbitration, by choice of the parties. The plat-
form employs a combination of incentives and structural tools aimed at ensuring
the integrity of juror voting and the smooth implementation of resolutions.
218. JURY.ONLINE 2 (2019), https://about.jury.online/images/jury_online_yellow_paper.pdf.
219. Id. at 12.
220. Id. at 3-4.
221. Id. at 5.
222. Id. at 7.
223. Id.
224. JURY.ONLINE, supra note 220, at 7.
225. Id. at 6.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2.
228. Id. at 3.
229. Id. at 6 (stating that “[s]ince judges are rated based on the judgments they pass and are rewarded
for their actions, the economic and rating component motivates and forces judges to investigate and
resolve disputes fairly and correctly, rather than to randomly pass their verdicts”).
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9. ECAF
ECAF stands for the dispute resolution and arbitration forum on EOS, a block-
chain protocol operated by EOS cryptocurrency.230 The forum was created as an
internal dispute resolution service for the community. Any member of the commu-
nity may submit a claim by way of an electronic message.231 Claims can relate to
bugs in the smart contract, the hacking of a Ricardian contract, or any other scam.232
The complainant must also specify the desired remedy, such as freezing the smart
contract or the account or canceling EOS tokens.233 A party may request an emer-
gency measure of protection during the arbitration.234
In terms of arbitrators, the default practice is to appoint a single arbitrator per
case.235 Appeals and major cases are heard by a panel of three.236 Arbitrators must
be independent and without conflict of interest.237 Where such conflict arises dur-
ing the handling of the case, the arbitrator must withdraw from the case. They are
also required to balance power between the parties, allow each side to present its
arguments, and respond to its counterpart, as well as to conduct a fair and efficient
process, and to document all communications in the case.238 Within these parame-
ters, the arbitrator has significant latitude to decide on the structure of the arbitra-
tion. In certain cases, such as where the dispute involves a party who is not part of
the community or involved in the contract, the authority of an external court is con-
sidered.239 Parties are encouraged not to be represented in the proceedings.240 The
rules determine which information relating to the case should be made public, but
also allow for exceptions, mainly for privacy considerations.241 The award can in-
clude various remedies such as the cancellation of tokens, the freezing of an ac-
count, temporary or ultimate removal from the community, reporting to external
bodies, and the like.242 The award is final but in some extreme cases appeals are
allowed.243
The significance of the EOS arbitration system is derived from its being an in-
house ODR forum that succeeded in attracting an impressive number of claims.
However, at the time this article is being written, the future of ECAF seems uncer-
tain. In the past few months ECAF has faced significant challenges to its legiti-
macy.244 This crisis arose due to several decisions rendered by ECAF’s volunteer
230. Dispute Resolution & Arbitration, EOSALL., https://eosalliance.io/dispute-resolution-arbitration/
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019).












243. ECAF Rules of Dispute Resolution, supra note 90.
244. AmyWan Lecture, Blockchain and Dispute Resolution, University of Haifa (via Videoconferenc-
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arbitrators to prevent the transfer of cryptocurrencies on EOS.245 Since the arbitra-
tors issued these decisions without reasoning, the entire operation of the arbitration
body was perceived as non-transparent and illegitimate.246 In an attempt to regain
legitimacy, one of the leaders of EOS approached Amy Wan, co-founder of Sage-
wise, to design an alternative system.247 Wan set up a diverse working group, which
included Colin Rule (founder of the eBay ODR system) and others who came up
with a dispute resolution scheme that would comport with the libertarian values that
many EOS community members ascribe to.248 Unfortunately, to date, there has
been no commitment to funding such scheme and there is currently a move within
the EOS community to do away with ECAF altogether.249 It remains to be seen
whether ECAF is able to regain legitimacy and maintain its role as EOS’s internal
dispute resolution body.
10. Interim Summary
The blockchain-based ODR projects that have been developed in the last two
years recognize the need for dispute resolution avenues on blockchain as well as the
potential of the blockchain environment to uniquely serve dispute resolution values
and goals, such as democratic decision-making and automatic enforcement of res-
olutions. Many of these solutions are based on game theory insights and an as-
sumption of rationality, and we have yet to see how well they translate into the
dispute resolution arena, which is fraught with cognitive biases and heuristics. Fur-
thermore, many of these projects require that they be actively adopted into the smart
contract governing parties’ transactions prior to the emergence of a conflict. The
question arises as to who will motivate parties to adopt such contracts, and who are
the intermediaries in the decentralized blockchain environment who could promote
such steps? One solution is that adopted by EOS—creating an in-house system. But
what about those that offer ODR externally?
Other questions relate to the nature of dispute resolution services envisioned.
Most of these ODR projects rely on juror voting and, in some cases, on traditional
human arbitration. To what extent will such jurors and arbitrators be available?
How will these efforts scale as blockchain transactions expand? The use of the
“fourth party” in the form of automated processes is currently quite limited, cer-
tainly when compared with ODR projects in other contexts.
The breadth of dispute resolution processes covered on blockchain also seems
constrained, with very few consensual dispute resolution processes being em-
ployed. While some endeavors such as Sagewise and Juris offer a broader spectrum
of processes, ranging from consensual, interest-based ones to adjudicative rights-





249. Id. See also https://eosauthority.com/polls_details?proposal=decaf_20190111&lnc=en (last visite
d on April 19, 2019).
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IV. BARRIERS TODISPUTE RESOLUTION ON BLOCKCHAIN
ODR has been successful where its design fulfilled adequate levels of trust,
expertise, and convenience and efficiency.250 If one of these elements is not present,
the system will not be used. Blockchain may have expertise built into software,
but, as indicated below, at present there is nothing convenient about using the block-
chain, and promises of built-in and absolute protections have proven to be false.
Indeed, as this paper was being completed, the latest news headline about the block-
chain stated that “[o]nce hailed as unhackable, blockchains are now getting
hacked.”251 Despite the need for addressing disputes systematically in this context,
the need for ODR has yet to be widely recognized and acted upon. In the following
sections, we explore some of the reasons why the spread of ODR in the blockchain
arena has been delayed.
A. CULTURAL BARRIERS
Blockchain was conceived of in a culture that celebrated disintermediation in
the name of democratization and dispersed power. In this environment, the focus
is on the group rather than the individual, and, as evidenced from the costs of repet-
itive hacks and password losses, promoting the group’s interest and ideals can jus-
tify sacrificing individual rights and interests. In addition, the human factor and the
notion of trust are displaced by a strong belief in the immutability of technology
and its power to prevent problems and disputes. The blockchain dispute culture is,
therefore, in direct tension with the tenets of dispute systems design.
Dispute systems design is the primary framework for analyzing the existing
culture of dispute resolution within a given setting as well as for thinking about the
ways in which alternative designs could breed different cultures for addressing and
preventing disputes. For one, the current thinking about dispute resolution is that
conflict is inevitable and an integral part of any human interaction.252 As we have
seen, the blockchain environment touts the immutable nature of transactions con-
ducted there and is premised on a presumption that outcomes are foreseeable and
can therefore be dealt with through smart programming in advance. A dispute sys-
tems design approach would perceive the blockchain enthusiasts’ belief in the abil-
ity to overcome conflict through appropriate technology as misguided. It would
promote in its place the recognition that problems can never be fully prevented since
reality is complex and humans are bound to have misunderstandings.
At the heart of dispute resolution lies the concept of legitimacy, which is ulti-
mately premised on trust—trust in the system, trust in the process, and trust in its
fairness—and therefore a willingness to abide by outcomes. In the blockchain con-
text, on the other hand, there is a belief that trust is generated through technology
by creating a secure enough environment that trust in anything but the blockchain
itself becomes unnecessary. This creates a problem when the technology fails to
deliver, as it has, and trust is broken, but no mechanisms for re-establishing it are
available.
250. KATSH&RIFKIN, supra note 14.
251. Orcutt, supra note 86.
252. Werbach, supra note 11, at 494.
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For dispute resolution processes to be adopted, however, there needs to be a
central authority that initiates its adoption, follows its implementation, and ensures
that such processes operate in a fair and effective manner.253 But, as we have seen,
such central authority is typically frowned upon in a setting that hails decentraliza-
tion and the downfall of intermediaries.
Finally, in dispute resolution, knowing the identity of the parties to the dispute
is often important for establishing trust, for understanding the context of the dispute
and its roots, for devising an appropriate resolution, and for ensuring effective exe-
cution. At the same time, blockchain is attractive to many because of the ability to
remain anonymous while securing the transaction. While this is not an insurmount-
able challenge, it nonetheless presents a challenge for the design of effective sys-
tems of dispute resolution.
These tensions may seem inherent, but, as we have seen in the description of
the evolution of blockchain, there are in fact intermediaries who can make govern-
ance decisions, among them decisions that have to do with dispute resolution efforts
(bitcoin and Ethereum developers, wallets, and others). To ensure the fairness and
effectiveness of such actions, they should be guided by the principles of dispute
systems design—ensuring stakeholder participation, the advancement of diverse
procedural values alongside substantive fairness, and a commitment to ongoing
learning and improvement of the dispute resolution system.
B. Legal Barriers
Another set of barriers has to do with the legal sphere. As a fast evolving,
distributed environment that operates across national borders, the blockchain setting
has proven to be challenging to regulate, much like other spheres of online activity
in the past. Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, alongside ICOs, have challenged
national regulators, with responses ranging from attempts to stifle such activities to
attempts to use such tools by regulators themselves. This is further complicated by
the anonymous and pseudonymous nature of many of these exchanges.
In terms of dispute resolution, this has meant that the law is elusive, courts are
inaccessible, and even where a court would be available, not only would the costs
be prohibitive, but enforcement could be a lost cause. For alternative dispute reso-
lution, the murky state of the law in this domain presents a challenge as well because
such processes typically take place in the “shadow of the law” and rely often on the
court system for the enforcement of resolutions reached.
Past experience with regulating online experience has shown us that while such
developments do pose significant challenges for the law, it is often the case that
regulators find a way to enforce the law where they wish to do so. The SEC ruling
in the case of Ethereum is one example in the blockchain context. We can expect
regulators’ sophistication in this area to increase and as the shadow of the law be-
comes clearer, such clarity will serve to enhance efforts to introduce ODR into
blockchain. ODR will then provide a more accessible avenue for addressing dis-
putes than courts, but may ultimately operate in their shadow.
253. Aarni Heiskanen, The Technology of Trust: How the Internet of Things and Blockchain Could
Usher in a New Era of Construction Productivity, 8 CONSTR. RES. & INNOVATION 66 (2017).
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C. Technological Barriers: Is this the 1990s all over again?
In many ways, the history of the internet in the 1990s resembles the develop-
ments in the blockchain arena these days. Both contexts exhibit strong distrust of
regulation, and a belief that the new environment will be dispute-free, and out of
the reach of the state and the law. As a widely circulated article in 1996 claimed,
Cyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally signifi-
cant (online) phenomena and physical location. The rise of the global
computer network is destroying the link between geographical location
and: (1) the power of local governments to assert control over online be-
havior; (2) the effects of online behavior on individuals or things; (3) the
legitimacy of the efforts of a local sovereign to enforce rules applicable to
global phenomena; and (4) the ability of physical location to give notice
of which sets of rules apply. The Net thus radically subverts a system of
rule-making based on borders between physical spaces, at least with re-
spect to the claim that cyberspace should naturally be governed by territo-
rially defined rules.254
A recent, similarly ambitious claim for the blockchain, stated that “blockchain
technology is being perceived, by the experts, as the next big revolution after the
Internet. Also, much bigger and magnificent than the internet itself. Both in terms
of the intricacies of the technology as well as the magnificence of change that it
promises to bring in the way we work, live and think.”255
In spite of these parallel claims, there are clear differences between the devel-
opment of the internet and that of blockchain. The internet was invented in 1969
and for more than two decades had a limited number of users. It required special
skill to master something like email and the public was largely unaware of it. This
changed dramatically in the early 1990s as the combination of the world wide web
and internet browsers made using the internet convenient. Internet service provid-
ers in the mid-1990s opened up access to anyone, and the lifting of a ban on online
commercial activity opened up the net to the general population.
Use of the blockchain is being hindered greatly by a lack of trust and conven-
ience. Aside from the numerous thefts, the language used to describe the blockchain
is, for non-experts, difficult to understand. There is a learning curve that deters
users, by employing terms such as fork, nodes, proof of work, on-chain and off-
chain, hash, DAO, smart contracts, and even cryptocurrencies. In other words, what
enabled the internet after an initial twenty-five years to rapidly expand is largely
missing with the blockchain. If this is true, the blockchain in 2019 is less the inter-
net of the 1990s but more the internet of the 1970s and 1980s.
The challenges facing the blockchain are, almost assuredly, solvable. And
there are problems to be solved. There are many areas in which record use and
security is poor. For example, electronic health records are now widely used but
254.David. R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, FIRSTMOND
AY (2006), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1310/1230.
255. Apurba Chakraborty, How Blockchain Promises to Heal Mankind’s Chronic Pains, MEDIUM
(Dec. 25, 2018), https://medium.com/altcoin-magazine/how-blockchain-promises-to-fix-the-trust-defi-
cit-in-todays-internet-economy-b210d931f163.
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errors are frequently present.256 Tracing the source of contaminated food or the
spread of illness is often difficult.
If one views the blockchain of the future as an advanced, trustworthy database
employing advanced, trustworthy forms of online dispute resolution, accelerated
growth is likely to occur.
256. Ethan Katsh et al., Is There an App for That? Electronic Health Records (EHRs) and a New En-
vironment of Conflict Prevention and Resolution, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 31 (2011).
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